Richmond-Ashland Railway Company v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Ex Rel., City of Richmond by unknown
\ 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
RECORD No. 1447 
RICHMOND-ASHLAND RAILWAY COMPANY 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA EX REL. CITY OF 
RICHMOND 
JAMES E. CANNON, 
City Attorney. 
CLYDE W , SAUNDERS & &ON •• INC., PRINTERS , RICHMOND , VA . 
IN THE 
.·Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
RECORD No. 1447 
RICHMOND-ASHLAND RAILWAY COMPANY 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA EX REL. CITY OF 
RICHMOND 
STATEMENT 
It is said at the foot of page 2 of the petition in this 
cause that the City of Richmond has never acquired an ease-
ment over the right-of-way of the Richmond-Ashland Rail-
w.ay. Company at Lombardy Street, by either deed or con-
demnation and that if it has any right to the use of such 
crossing, it is either a permissive use or an easement ac-
quired by common law dedication. The city disputes this 
assertion and directs the court's attention to the following 
statement of facts: 
By deed dated February 16, 1910 (106) the Richmond 
and Chesapeak;e Bay Railway Company, predecessor in 
right and title to the Richmond-Ashland Railway Company, 
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hereinafter referred to as the company;· conveyed to the 
-public . t~o·-thirty~foot strips. of :land for highway purposes, 
lying on either edge of the one .hundred foot roadway then 
known as Brook Turnpike, retaining as a right-of-way for 
railway purposes, a strip forty feet wide in the center. Said 
deed contains the following language (111): 
"* * * and said parties hereby recognize the right 
of said Richmond and Chesapeake Bay Railway Com-
pany to fence said right-of-way with wire or other 
suitable material, provided · said fence does not inter-
fere with existing crossings or crossings which may be 
hereafter lawfully established." 
It appears from the uncontradicted testimony of F. 
Will and J. B. Wittkamp (4f).y47), that the Lombardy 
Street crossing was an existing crossing at the time of the 
execution of the said deed and consequently, was preserved 
and dedicated as a crossing by the terms of the deed itself. 
In addition to this, reference is made to section 24 of 
the c~ty's charter which ·has been in force since 1870, which 
reads in part as follows : 
"Whenever any piec~, parcel or strip of land shall 
have been opened to and . used by the public as any 
street, alley, lane or part thereof for the period of five 
years, the ·same shall thereby become a street, · alley, 
lane or part .thereof for all pur.pos~s and the city shall 
have the same authority and jurisdiction over and. 
right and interest therein as they have by law over the 
streets, allel;S ~nd lanes laid out by it."· 
In the fourth paragraph of the company's answer (85), 
the averment is made that within a few years past, at great 
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expense to itself, the company changed the grade of its 
tracks and laid a cement roadway across the same at Lom-
bardy Street in order to accommodate the -City of Rich-
mond. W. F. LaPrade, an engineer .in the city's Department 
of Public Works, testified ( 49), that the work referred to 
in this paragraph of the company's answer was done in 
1921 and hence, it is apparent that at least since that time 
Lombardy Street has become a public street for all pur-
poses within the purview of said section 24 of the city's 
charter. 
With this exception, the city accepts as correct the 
s~tement of facts contained on pages two and three of .the 
petition. 
ARGUMENT 
As part of this brief, the city adopts the "statement 
of facts and reasons" to be found on pages 126 to 139 in-
clusive of the record. At page 182, we find the following: 
"The Commission does not hold that police power 
in the instant case is not expressly conferred upon 
the city of Richmond, but it does hold that such police 
power resides in the City of Richmond as is essential 
to the accomplishment of the objects involved in its 
creation as a municipal corporation under the Con-
stitution and laws of Virginia, and that the exercise 
in the instant case even though the police power exer-
cised be only general, is reasonable and proper and im-
posed upon the company the legal obligation which it 
is the purpose of this proceeding to enforce." 
It is the contention of the city not merely that the 
facts show th~t the requirements of the city ordinance un-
der which this proceeding was instituted are reasonable, but 
that the courts cannot inquire into this question of reason-
ableness because the particular police power has been ·ex-
pressly conferred upon the city by the General -Assembly. 
In action 19 of the city's charter is to be found the 
general welf~re clause authorizing the council ·of the city 
to enact suitable ordinances to secure and promote the gen-
. eral welfare of the inhabitants of the city by them :deemed 
proper for the safety, peace, good order, convenience and 
morals of the community and in section 19g is to be found 
the authority to close or extend, widen or narrow, -lay out 
and graduate, -pave and Qtherwise improve streets and public 
alleys in the city and have them properly lighted and kept 
in good order. Also, in section 19i is to be found . the fol-
lowing authority vested in the council: 
"To authorize the laying down of railway tracks 
in the streets of the city and the running of cars 
thereon, under such conditions and regulations as they 
may prescribe, and also from time to time to prescribe 
additional conditions and requirements as to the con-
struction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of 
the tracks and roadbed and cars and the running of 
cars on such tracks," 
and finally, in section 19j is to be found a provision spe-
cifically authorizing the council to designate the route and 
grade of any railroad to be laid in the city. 
In volume 2 of McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 
2nd Ed. Section 760, the law is stated to be: 
"Where passed by virtue of express power, not 
inconsistent with the Federal Constitution or treaties 
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution and 
general laws of the State (unless as to the latter 
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exceptions have been duly authorized), and such power 
has been substantially followed and exercised in a 
reasonable manner, the ordinance will be sustained 
regardless of the opinion of the court respecting its 
reasonableness. In brief, if passed by virtue of express 
power, an ordinance cannot be set aside by a court for 
mere unreasonableness, since questions as to the wis-
dom and expediency of a regulation rest alone with 
the State law making power. And this is true al-
though such ordinance would have been regarded as 
unreasonable if it had been passed under a grant of 
power general in its nature or the implied or incidental 
powers of the municipality. * • * 
"The doctrine may be stated that the power of the 
court to declare an ordinance unreasonable and there-
fore void, is practically restricted to cases wherein 
neither the charter· nor applicable statute has dealt 
with the subject matter of the ordinance specifically, 
and consequently to cases in which the ordinance was 
passed under the supposed implied or incidental powers 
of the corporation merely. But whether the munic-
ipality had power to enact an ordinance, or whether 
the ordinance is valid and constitutional, is for the 
courts." 
In 43 Corpus Juris, under the, heading of Municipal 
Corporations, Section 316, a similar expression is to be 
found: 
"As a general rule, if the Legislature has ex-
pressly conferred upon a municipal corporation power 
to do a certain act, the courts cannot question, except 
upon constitutional grounds, the right of the munic-
. ipality to exercise the power·; as for instance, on the 
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ground that it might have been regarded as unreason-
able if it had been done under the implied or general 
power of the municipality." 
In the recent case of Scruggs v. Wheeler, 4 S. W., 2nd 
Series, pp. 616-619, this doctrine is tersely and forcefully 
expressed in the following language: 
"The rule is generally announced that where the 
legislature in terms gives a municipality power to pass 
ordinances of a specific and defined character, they 
cannot be successfully attacked, except upon constitu-
. tional grounds, as being unreasonable, though they 
may be so impeached if passed under merely incidental 
or general power." 
This Court is in full accord with this general principle, 
as may be seen by reference to the case of Danville v. Hat-
cher, 101 Va. 523, in which was assailed as unreasonable, 
an ordinance to regulate saloons, pased under a specific 
grant of authority by the General Assembly. 
At the foot of page 530, the court had this to say: 
"The language in which the grant of power is 
couched in this case, is unmistakable and too plain to 
permit of elucidation. It leaves it absolutely within 
the control of the council to determine whether they 
will wholly suppress or grant the privilege, subject to 
such restrictions as they may see fit to impose. 
"Within the sphere of tlieir delegated powers, 
municipal corporations have as absolute control as the 
General Assembly would have if it had never delegated 
such powers and exercised them by its own eniict-
ments, and the courts can no more interfere with the 
acts of the one than the other. TO' permit such inter-
ference would be to deny the existence of a discretion-
ary power~ and transfer its exercise from one co-
ordinate branch of the government to another." 
At page 533. in commenting upon a quotation from 
1st Dillon on Municipal Corporations,· Sec. 328, the court 
said: 
"But these prinei:ples· have no application where 
the Legislature, as. in the present case, has invested the 
City Council with all its police powers over the subject. 
Under such conditions no case has been found which 
warrants an interference by the courts with the dis-
cretion of the Council, exercised in good faith for the 
general welfare. of the inhabitants of the city." 
On page 584,. the court quoted with approval from the 
case of Beers v. Dalles City1 16 Ore. 384. to the following 
effect: 
"When a City Council is vesfed with full power 
over a subject and the mode of the exercise of such 
power is not limited by the charter,. it may exercise 
it in any manner most convenient." 
It is only sufficient to read sections 19g and 19j of the 
City Charter to see that the council is vested with specific 
authority to require the railway company to do the things 
set out in the ordinance of July 7, 1982,. and this phase of 
the controversy will not be further discussed. 
Counsel for the company, at the foot of page 16 of 
the petition, state that the identical question involved in 
the case at bar was passed upon by your Honors in the 
case of Lynchburg Traction Co. v. Lynchburg, 142 Va. 255. 
We sharply differ with this: statement. The Lynchburg case 
does not involve any question of the. crossing of a: public 
highway by· the traction company. In that. case. the trac-
tion company dedicated to the. County of· Campbell as one 
of the public highways of the county, what was known as 
Rivermont Avenue, but according to the. deed of· dedication, 
such public use as· a highway was· "to be subject to the use 
of the said company for the purpose of constructing there-
in railroads whether to be run by steam, electricity, horses 
or any other motive power." Of course when the city of 
Lynchburg enlarged its boundaries so as to include River-
mont Avenue, it succeeded only to whatever rights the 
County of Campbell may have had~ Your Honors merely 
held that the city of Lynchburg had no power to compel 
the traction company to pave Rivermont Avenue on both 
sides of and between its tracks, stating that this require-
ment of paving might have been exacted as the price paid 
for a privilege, but inasmuch as no privilege of the sort 
had been granted to the traction company, the city of 
Lynchburg could not exact the price. At the foot of page 
266 in the opinion, this was said: 
"Of course when the city limits were extended the 
railway company became subject to the police power 
of the city and it could regulate the speed of its cars, 
the keeping of the tracks safe and in gpod condition (as 
distinguished from the maintenance of the railway 
itself) , the giving of signals, the stopping of cars at 
convenient points, the keeping of watchmen or gates 
at specified points, requiring cars to be provided with 
fenders or other matters pertaining to police regula-
tions, but this gave it no right to require street im-
provements or repairs not caused by any unlawful, 
negligent or improper act of the company." 
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In the instant case, when Lombardy Street became a 
street, crossing the right-of-way of the company, whether 
by common law dedication or by other dedication, expressed 
or implied, it became in the language of the eity charter a 
street "for all purposes" and the city was given the same 
authority and jurisdiction over and right and interest there-
in as it has by law over streets laid out by it, and the city 
is merely undertaking to exercise its police power over 
Lombardy Street to the same extent that it has the right to 
exercise the same in respect to railway crossings of other 
streets, there being no reservation, condition or exception 
reserved to the company in respect to it. 
The company claims that it has been denied the equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, for the reason that the 
city is not undertaking to exact of other street railway com-
panies the same requirements that it is undertaking to exact 
of the company. This contention made so little impression 
upon the Corporation Commission that it was not even 
referred to in the lucid and convincing opinion handed down 
by that body. It seems to us a sufficient reply to say that 
to apply the equal protection clause of the Federal Con-
stitution to a case of this sort would be to throttle all 
progress and improvement and preclude the city council 
from ever commencing any proceeding tending ·to promote 
the welfare of the community. 
A typewritten copy of this brief has been delivered to 
Messrs. Kirsh and Bazile, counsel for the company, on this 
27th day of December, 1933. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES E. CANNON, 
City Attorney. 
